Sunday 17 October 2010

The use of soft power in contemporary diplomacy (exemplified with the Middle East)




Thinking of changes in the model of diplomacy over the years got me to conclusion it's not easy to judge which of them is of the highest importance, in the end it all depends on the context of their application and its results. However, I had no problem deciding on which transision I actually find the most interesting when looking through the prism of recent international events.
Just a brief reminder, the term "soft power" wa invented by Joseph Nye to name the "capacity of getting others to want what you want" (Nye, 1990) by the use of negotiations rather than "hard" military force.
Many anaysts find the question of the use of "soft power" engrossing when it comes to discussing the Middle East. especially with the recent example: Iran's president Ahmadinejad's visit to Lebanon.
Flynt and Mann Everett argue in their article for "The Huffington Post" that Iranian soft power is strategically significant and it is still growing (Flynt, Mann Everett, 2010).
Let's look at the example: president of Iran arrives in Beirut: huge vivid posters, warm welcome, his speeches about co-operation and on the contrary rumours about Ahmadinejad's symbolic throwing of a stone toward the Jewish state (Daragahi, 2010).
Just soft power, provocation or maybe already deterrence?
Among some there is a firm belief that the "friendly" visit is just a pretext to turn Lebanon into an Iranian base. What is more, the White House spokesman Robert Gibbs claims, that Hezbollah "values its allegiance to Iran over its allegiance to Lebanon" thus making the entire event looking even more insincere (Al Jazeera, 2010). Others claim the visit to be a pure victory parade and a show to threaten Israel, the USA and its Arab allies (Daragahi, 2010).
On the other hand, we have Hezbollah's supporters commenting on the visit that it is "a symbolic show of support give to the vitriolic attacks on the resistance", who next say "Israel does not need a provocation to launch an attack. When Israel sees conditions are right, it will launch its own provocative action or attack." (Daragahi, 2010). Seems like there is some nuclear diplomacy tension there after all.
In further persuasion of its usefullness for Lebanon, Hezbollah claims Iran has a substantial role in rebuilding Southern Beirut damaged after the fights with Israel. Moreover, it is supposed to be far better armed than it was during those fights and in case of the new armed conflict, with the help of Syria it is capable of easily defeating Israel (Daragahi, 2010).
We can clearly see that Iran wants the event to be perceived as a routine, friendly visit (plus the announcement of all the aids to be given to help Lebanon) by the public but what's really under that cover? It may be that they want Lebanon's ties to the West and the USA to be unbound or to put Israel under a psychological pressure. Perhaps, there is even a possibility of a "hard power" support in case of a new Israeli attack on Lebanon in the future.
I think the current Middle East example illustrates how "soft power" can be contemporarily used and even though it seems to be a better solution to the open "hard" armed fight, in truth it can actually have a completely different implied meaning. I leave the question open: is it really just conflict free negotiations or is it even more contentious?

1 comment:

  1. This is an interesting episode you have chosen to reflect on - it raises a host of issues. But given Iran's links to Hezbollah, is this really a demonstration of soft power or rather a case of veiled threats and rhetorical flourishes?

    I should also have liked you to say some more about the nature of diplomacy. Your focus tends to be on soft power rather than the consequences for diplomatic practice.

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